Service:
zebra
Protocol:
TCPPort:
2601Used for:
Zebra routing daemon (Quagga/FRR)Why It’s Open
Port 2601 is used by the Zebra Routing Daemon, which is a key component of Quagga and FRRouting (FRR) network routing software suites. This service manages and coordinates multiple routing protocols like BGP, OSPF, and RIP, providing a unified interface for configuring and monitoring network routing tables. Organizations use this service for implementing dynamic routing in enterprise networks, internet service providers, and data centers, allowing for automated network path determination and traffic management across complex network infrastructures.
Common Risks
- Route hijacking
Malicious route advertisements can redirect network traffic - Denial of service
Processing of excessive routing updates can overwhelm the daemon - Default/weak authentication
Insecure credentials allowing unauthorized configuration changes - Network topology exposure
Disclosure of internal network architecture and addressing schemes - Buffer overflows
Malformed routing messages can trigger memory corruption vulnerabilities - Unsecured management interface
Lack of encryption on administrative communications - Routing table manipulation
Unauthorized modification of network paths affecting traffic flow
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Enumeration & Testing
Service Detection:
nmap -sV -p 2601Zebra Connection Test:
telnet 2601Password Guessing:
hydra -l admin -P /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt telnet -s 2601Route Information Query:
vtysh -c "show ip route" -hProtocol Enumeration:
vtysh -c "show running-config" -hWhat to Look For
| Checkpoint | What it means |
|---|---|
| Quagga/FRR version | Identify outdated versions with known vulnerabilities |
| Authentication methods | Check if default password “zebra” is in use |
| Access control lists | Verify IP-based restrictions on management interfaces |
| Route filtering | Check for proper filtering of route advertisements |
| Network exposure | Determine if service is exposed beyond management networks |
| Protocol security features | Verify if MD5 authentication is enabled for routing protocols |
| Log configuration | Check if routing changes and administrative access are logged |
Mitigation
- Change default passwords
Replace default “zebra” password with strong alternatives - Implement ACLs
Restrict access to management interfaces by IP address - Enable MD5 authentication
Configure cryptographic authentication for routing protocols - Use route filters
Implement proper ingress and egress filtering for routes - Regularly update routing software
Apply security patches to Quagga/FRR components - Configure management VRF
Isolate routing management traffic from data plane - Implement RPKI
Use Resource Public Key Infrastructure to validate route origins - Enable comprehensive logging
Monitor and alert on routing changes and authentication failures - Use prefix limits
Configure maximum prefixes to prevent route table overflow attacks
TL;DR
- Port 2601 = Zebra Routing daemon management interface
- Protocol: TCP - Telnet-like command interface
- High impact service: Controls network routing decisions and traffic paths
- Security focus: Authentication, network isolation, and route validation critical
Known CVEs and Exploits
- CVE-2017-16227 – Quagga BGP daemon denial of service through specially crafted BGP packets
- CVE-2018-5378 – Quagga BGP infinite loop vulnerability allowing remote DoS attacks
- CVE-2019-15133 – FRR BGP daemon memory corruption leading to remote code execution
- CVE-2003-0858 – Zebra routing daemon buffer overflow vulnerability enabling remote execution
- CVE-2020-17446 – FRR privilege escalation vulnerability in OSPF packet handling
- BGP hijacking attacks – Unauthorized route advertisements causing traffic redirection
- Default credential exploitation – Using well-known default password “zebra” to gain administrative access