Service:
infocryptProtocol:
TCPPort:
2233Used for:
Registered to infocrypt — a bare, assignee-only IANA entry with no RFC or real-world deployment, where an open 2233 is usually a custom, dev, or unknown service parked on the portPort 2233 is the registered port for infocrypt, listed by IANA as the service name infocrypt on both TCP and UDP. It’s a bare, assignee-only registration — the name hints at an “info crypt” (information-encryption) product, but there is no RFC, no documented protocol, and effectively zero real-world deployment behind it. In practice 2233 is an empty registration with no real service to meet — an open 2233 is far more likely a custom or development app, an alternate service, or some game/IoT client parked on a tidy number than an actual infocrypt daemon. As with port 666, port 1000, port 1978, and port 2020, the real job when you find 2233 open is to identify what is actually listening.
Why It’s Open
- Legacy IANA assignment. The
infocryptlabel lingers in port databases and scanner output (nmap maps 2233 to it by name), so tools recognise the port even though no infocrypt service was ever widely deployed. - Assignee-only registration. The entry names an assignee but carries no protocol spec or public software, so there is nothing standard to actually run on 2233.
- Ad-hoc app use. Assorted apps, games, and IoT/embedded devices pick 2233 as a custom port, so a live 2233 is usually one of those rather than infocrypt.
- Not a mainstream service. No widely deployed daemon genuinely claims 2233, so real “infocrypt” traffic is almost never what you are looking at.
Common Risks
- Unknown, unauthenticated service. The biggest risk on 2233 is simply not knowing what it is. An open, unidentified listener deserves immediate fingerprinting rather than a shrug.
- Hand-rolled custom apps. A non-standard port invites undocumented services — dev builds left running, prototype APIs, or app back-ends — often with weak or no authentication.
- Misleading “crypt” name. The
infocryptlabel implies encryption, which can lull you into assuming the traffic is protected when whatever is actually bound to 2233 may have no transport security at all. - No transport security by default. Whatever answers on 2233 — a custom service, an app back-channel, or a device UI — expect no encryption or authentication unless you verify otherwise.
- False attribution. A stray
infocryptlabel in scan output can lull you into ignoring a real, exploitable service. Never trust the label — verify the service.
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Enumeration & Testing
Detect and fingerprint the service
nmap -sV -p 2233 <target>Nmap may print infocrypt from its service database — treat that as a guess from the port number, not a verified protocol. There is no dedicated infocrypt NSE script or Metasploit module; the entire task is identifying whatever actually answers.
Probe UDP as well
nmap -sU -sV -p 2233 <target>The assignment covers both transports, so check UDP too — a listener may answer on only one.
Raw banner grab
nc -nv <target> 2233A raw connect proves the port is open and often reveals a banner, prompt, or shell-like response that gives away a custom app, a game/IoT service, or a backdoor.
Test for an HTTP service
curl -sI http://<target>:2233Many custom services on high ports speak HTTP — a Server header or HTML response here often identifies the real service faster than anything else.
Log every open instance and whatever you fingerprint so it lands in the final pentest report instead of a scratch terminal.
What to Look For
| Checkpoint | What it means |
|---|---|
| TCP or UDP 2233 open and answering | Something is bound to the port — identify it; it is almost never a real infocrypt service |
Nmap reports infocrypt |
A service-database guess from the port number, not a verified protocol — confirm with a banner grab |
HTTP response or Server header on 2233 |
Likely a custom app or device panel — enumerate it as whatever it actually is |
| Login banner or shell-like prompt | Possible custom service, game/IoT back-end, or backdoor on a non-standard port — capture and analyse the banner |
| Default or missing authentication | Custom app or device UI left exposed — test for default credentials |
| No banner, silently drops connections | Custom or undocumented service — fingerprint deeper or capture the traffic |
Known CVEs and Exploits
- No protocol-specific CVEs. There are essentially no CVEs for
infocryptor for “port 2233” as a network service — it was never a widely deployed listening daemon, and NVD has no infocrypt entry. - Old page claims removed. A previous version of this page listed CVE-2017-9381, CVE-2018-12067, and CVE-2019-8432 as “InfoCrypt” vulnerabilities. All three were removed as mislabeled: CVE-2017-9381 is a CSRF flaw in Vera VeraEdge/Veralite smart-home hubs, CVE-2018-12067 is an integer overflow in the Substratum (SUB) Ethereum ERC-20 token contract, and CVE-2019-8432 is a cross-site scripting bug in CmsEasy 7.0 — none has anything to do with infocrypt or port 2233.
- The real exposure is the unknown service. Treat an open 2233 as “identify this listener,” then apply whatever CVE and exploit research matches the software you actually find — a custom app, a game/IoT back-end, an admin panel, or a backdoor — rather than an infocrypt-specific bug.
Mitigation
- Identify what’s really on 2233 first. Fingerprint the service before anything else. If it isn’t something you deliberately configured, treat it as suspicious.
- Close it if it isn’t sanctioned. There’s no reason to expose a vestigial port like 2233 on a modern host — block it at the firewall and stop the listener.
- Don’t run unknown services on arbitrary ports. If you must host something real, put it on its documented port and record it, so 2233 never becomes an unexplained open listener.
- Lock down anything legitimate. If 2233 is a real app back-end or admin panel, put it behind authentication and TLS, restrict it to trusted networks, and change any default credentials.
- Monitor and alert. Add 2233 to IDS and egress rules so any new listener or unexpected traffic is flagged early, and investigate an unexplained listener as a possible incident.
Real-World Example
Port 2233’s story is the gap between the label and reality. IANA hands the number to infocrypt — a name that promises an “information-encryption” service — yet there is no protocol spec, no software, and no deployment behind it, just an assignee and an otherwise blank line in the registry. So when a scan reports 2233 as infocrypt, the name is pure service-database guesswork: whatever is actually answering is almost always something else — a custom app back-end, a game or IoT client, a dev server someone forgot to stop, or a backdoor squatting on a memorable number. The encryption-sounding label makes it worse, because it invites the assumption that the traffic is protected when it may be plaintext. The lesson is the same as every obscure port: fingerprint the service rather than trust the name.
FAQ
What is port 2233 used for?
Port 2233 is the IANA-registered port for infocrypt on both TCP and UDP. It’s a bare, assignee-only registration with no RFC, documented protocol, or known deployment, so the assignment is essentially vestigial. In practice an open 2233 is more likely a custom or development app, a game/IoT client, or an alternate service than any genuine infocrypt traffic.
What is infocrypt?
It’s the service name IANA assigns to port 2233. The name suggests an “info crypt” (information-encryption) product, but no such daemon was ever widely deployed and there is no public documentation of the protocol — so infocrypt is best treated as a label rather than a service you’ll actually meet on the wire.
What service runs on port 2233?
Officially infocrypt. Realistically, anything: because 2233 is a memorable number with no real service behind it, it’s a common pick for custom apps, dev servers, and assorted game/IoT clients. Always fingerprint the listener instead of trusting the port label.
Is port 2233 dangerous?
The port isn’t dangerous by itself — what’s dangerous is an unidentified service on it. An open 2233 that you didn’t deliberately configure should be treated as a potential exposed app or backdoor until you’ve confirmed exactly what’s listening. Don’t let the “crypt” in the name convince you the traffic is encrypted.
How do I secure or close port 2233?
Identify the service first, then shut it down if it isn’t sanctioned: stop the process, block 2233 at the firewall, and investigate the host if the listener is unexplained. If you legitimately run something on 2233, move it to a documented port (or put it behind authentication and TLS) and record it. Rescan to confirm 2233 no longer answers.
TL;DR
- Service:
infocrypt(IANA) — a bare, assignee-only registration with no RFC, protocol spec, or real-world deployment; the assignment is largely vestigial - Default port: 2233/TCP and 2233/UDP
- Biggest risk: an open 2233 is rarely a real infocrypt service — it’s more likely a custom or dev app, a game/IoT client, or an admin panel parked on a memorable number, so the finding is “identify the unknown service”
- Mitigation: fingerprint what’s actually on 2233, close it if it isn’t sanctioned, don’t run unknown services on arbitrary ports, and lock down anything legitimate behind auth and TLS